NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Volume 19 | Issue 4

Article 3

1-1-2018

Political Machines: The Role of Software in
Enabling and Detecting Partisan Gerrymandering
Under the Whitford Standard
Graeme Earle

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Graeme Earle, Political Machines: The Role of Software in Enabling and Detecting Partisan Gerrymandering Under the Whitford Standard,
19 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 67 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol19/iss4/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 19, ONLINE: DECEMBER 2017
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AND DETECTING PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING UNDER THE
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Graeme Earle*
Partisan gerrymandering, the practice of shaping district lines
to the advantage of one political party, has haunted American
politics for centuries. Innovations in districting software have
sharpened the effects of partisan gerrymanders by increasing their
advantages while concealing their creation. In response, courts are
reevaluating
the
judicial
manageability
of
partisan
gerrymandering. Any standard arising from this reevaluation will
inevitably require plaintiffs to prove that the drafters of district
plans intended to gerrymander. Due to the complexity of measuring
partisan advantage, this proof will need to come in the form of
witness testimony or close observation of the districting process. By
using automated districting software, legislators could gerrymander
without leaving behind any of this critical evidence, thereby
enabling partisan gerrymandering. New laws, policy, and
improvements to algorithmic generations of alternative district
plans promise to preserve the democratic process by preventing
gerrymanders altogether or detecting gerrymanders based on their
effects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Partisan gerrymandering is the practice of drawing voting
districts to favor one political party over the other.1 The shape of
voting districts can disadvantage a political party by diluting the
power of that parties’ votes until they win fewer seats relative to the
number of votes they secure.2 Partisan gerrymanders reduce the
power of voters by “packing” them into districts that win by
excessive margins3 and by “cracking” voters across multiple
districts that each lose by slim margins.4 Together, these methods
can allow political parties to entrench themselves in office by
consistently holding a legislative majority even when they fail to
win a majority of votes, effectively stripping away the public’s
voting power.5

1
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 109 (1986) (explaining that a
“reapportionment plan constituted a political gerrymander” when it intended to
disadvantage a political party by arranging district lines to dilute votes cast for
that party).
2
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 831, 834 (2015)
(explaining how a gerrymandered district plan can secure more seats for a political
party even when that party wins fewer votes).
3
Id. A district is “packed” when a large majority of voters support one political
party in excess of the number required to win that district’s election. Id.
4
Id. A district is “cracked” when the majority party consistently wins by a slim
margin, causing minority votes to count for nothing. Id.
5
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 886 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (“The danger
with extreme partisan gerrymanders is that they entrench a political party in
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Once or twice a decade, the Supreme Court considers the issue
of partisan gerrymandering.6 Nevertheless, the Court has generally
refrained from striking down district plans as unconstitutional
partisan gerrymanders.7 Courts have hesitated to interfere with
partisan gerrymandering in large part due to the practice’s long
history8 and the legislature’s constitutional mandate to redraw
district lines.9 The most compelling reason for the Court’s refusal to
interfere with partisan gerrymandering has been the lack of a
judicially manageable standard.10 Unlike racial gerrymandering,
partisan gerrymandering involves mutable characteristics whose
measurement would “cast[] [judges] forth upon a sea of
imponderables”11 as they try to determine exactly how much partisan
advantage a district plan must confer before courts have the power
to intervene.
power, making that party—and therefore the state government—impervious to
the interests of citizens affiliated with other political parties.”).
6
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 361 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“Where unjustified entrenchment takes place, voters find it far more difficult to
remove those responsible for a government they do not want; and . . . democratic
values are dishonored.”); see also Davis, 478 U.S. at 124 (“[E]ach political group
in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any
other political group.”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (holding
that district plans which disproportionately affect the voting strength of political
groups “may be vulnerable” to challenges under the Equal Protection clause);
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (holding that district plans may be
challenged as unconstitutional when they “minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population”).
7
See Davis, 478 U.S. at 143 (holding that evidence of a partisan gerrymander
failed to “surmount the threshold requirement” of showing how much partisan
advantage would constitute too much); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (“Eighteen
years of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us that Bandemer is
incapable of principled application. We would therefore overrule that case, and
decline to adjudicate these political gerrymandering claims.”).
8
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274 (“Political gerrymanders are not new to the
American scene.”).
9
U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 4 (conferring to legislatures the power to determine “the
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections”).
10
See League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006)
(holding that the plaintiffs presented no “workable test for judging partisan
gerrymanders”); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (“[W]e must conclude that
political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable . . . .”).
11
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 290.
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Free from fear of court intervention, legislatures have crafted
powerful and blatant gerrymanders. For example, when citizens
brought suit against North Carolina’s 2016 Congressional District
Plan, one of the members of the legislative committee in charge of
drafting that plan admitted to the court that he “propose[d] that [the
Committee] draw the maps to give a partisan advantage to 10
Republicans and 3 Democrats because [he] d[id] not believe it
[would be] possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2
Democrats.”12 The Supreme Court later struck down the plan as a
racial gerrymander.13 However, had the plan not gerrymandered
along racial lines, the North Carolina GOP would have avoided
court intervention despite the fact that the committee member
“‘acknowledge[d] freely that this would be a political gerrymander,’
which [the drafting Committee member] maintained ‘is not against
the law.’”14
In 2012, the Wisconsin district court faced a similarly blatant
gerrymander when the Wisconsin Republican Party won 60 out of
99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly despite only winning 48.6% of
the vote.15 When members of the public sued, the Wisconsin district
court found itself thrust into Scalia’s “sea of imponderables.”16 To
navigate its waters, the court produced the following standard for
the judicial management of partisan gerrymandering:
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause prohibit a
redistricting scheme which (1) is intended to place a severe impediment
on the effectiveness of the votes of individual citizens on the basis of
their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified
on other, legitimate legislative grounds.17

In October of 2017, the Supreme Court considered whether this
standard is judicially manageable.18
12

Common Cause v. Rucho, 240 F. Supp. 3d 376, 378–79 (2017) (alterations
in original).
13
See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017) (affirming the lower
court’s finding that North Carolina’s 2016 Congressional District plan constituted
an unconstitutional racial gerrymander).
14
Common Cause, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 378–79 (alterations in original).
15
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
16
Id. at 884 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 290).
17
Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161).
18
See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
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Even if the Whitford standard holds, it will not spell the end for
partisan gerrymandering. The Whitford standard requires a plaintiff
to prove an intent to gerrymander, in addition to the effects arising
from that intent.19 So far, the ample direct and circumstantial
evidence arising from blatant partisan gerrymandering have made
intent and effects easier to prove.20 The Court in Whitford, however,
foresaw a world where intent becomes difficult to prove as “the
drafters’ intent . . . is hidden from the casual observer.”21
Automated districting software will enable legislatures to hide
the intent and effects of their gerrymanders from all observers,
casual or otherwise. By producing district plans without leaving
behind the “far more direct” evidence relied upon in previous
cases, 22 automated districting software would obscure a legislature’s
intent to gerrymander. By improving traditional districting
objectives alongside partisan advantage, automated districting
software would hide the effects of a gerrymander. Together, this
would leave plaintiffs with a difficult evidentiary burden. Meeting
this burden will require self-regulation on the part of the legislature,
tailored public disclosure laws, or improved techniques for
algorithmically generating alternative district plans.
This Recent Development will present its argument in three
parts. Part II will explain how automated districting software will
impede plaintiffs’ ability to bring claims of partisan gerrymandering
by hiding a legislature’s intent to gerrymander and the effects that
the gerrymander has on the district plan. Part III will explore
solutions to automated districting software including third party
voting commissions, transparent redistricting, and improved
methods for detecting partisan gerrymanders.

19
See id. at 890 (explaining that they were “able to discern the legislature’s
intent more easily and less intrusively because the evidence [was] far more
direct”).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
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II. THE EFFECTS OF AUTOMATED DISTRICTING SOFTWARE ON
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
Drafting gerrymanders by hand must have felt like toasting a
slice of bread over a campfire. The process was messy, imprecise,
and left distinct, visible marks.23 Even the term “gerrymander”
originates from a district approved in 1812 by early American
politician Elbridge Gerry.24 The district pursued partisan advantage
over traditional districting objectives like compactness or equal
population, and as a result it twisted grotesquely into a salamanderlike silhouette that satirists at the time dubbed a “Gerry-mander.”25
Modern districting more closely resembles toasting a slice of
bread on a stovetop. Technology aids drafters, but the process still
requires human attention. Districting software has become
increasingly accessible and convenient.26 Now, state and national
governments redistrict using established software.27 Most state
governments use semi-automated software based on Geographic
Information Software (GIS),28 which assists drafters and analysts by
setting lines along natural boundaries and making minor
adjustments where needed. 29 Convenient enough to warrant their
price tag, semi-automated districting software still requires human
drafters to construct maps and analysts to calculate values that the
23

See Greg Miller, The Map That Popularized the Word ‘Gerrymander’, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(June
28,
2017),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/06/map-gerrymander-redistrictinghistory-newspaper/ (recalling how the practice of gerrymandering predates
Congress and how early gerrymanders were so visually distinct as to resemble
“horrid monster[s]”).
24
See id.
25
See id.
26
See Robert G. Boatright et al., Teaching Redistricting: Letting the People
Draw the Lines for the People’s House, 46 POL. SCI. & POL. 387, 387 (2013).
27
See
autoBound,
CITYGATEGIS,
http://www.citygategis.com/products/autobound (last visited October 18, 2017)
(“AutoBound is the premier redistricting application developed by Citygate
GIS . . . . AutoBound was the primary redistricting application used in over 30
states for creating the 2000 Congressional and Legislative districts.”).
28
See id. (touting that twenty-nine U.S. state governments currently use their
GIS to redistrict).
29
See id. (enumerating the benefits of their GIS, including boundary-setting and
a degree of automation).

DEC. 2017]

BIASED MACHINES

73

program does not internally generate.30 For example, in Whitford,
“[t]he process of drafting and evaluating . . . alternative district maps
spanned several months” and required a commissioned team of
drafters and a professional analyst.31 Even with the aid of these
technologies, legislatures still produce gerrymanders, which casual
observers can visually distinguish from legitimate districts.32
Creating districts using automated software will resemble
toasting bread in a toaster. Drafters need only insert data, set the dial,
and wait until the software generates a complete district plan. These
programs are overwhelmingly “heuristic” in that they initially create
bad plans and then refine those plans over time based on
predetermined factors.33 There are several ways to go about refining
these plans ranging from slowly tweaking district boundaries all the
way to rapidly generating and culling batches of plans until an
acceptable plan evolves.34 Whatever the method, these programs
generate plans from start to finish without additional human input.
Automated districting software can produce gerrymanders
“hidden from the casual observer.”35 The lack of human attention
during the districting process leaves behind far less evidence of a
30
See id. Mapping software displays the boundaries between communities of
interest and can adjust lines to even out population between districts.
Compactness and partisan advantage, however, must be user-defined. Id.
31
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 891 (2016).
32
See Christopher Ingraham, America’s Most Gerrymandered Congressional
Districts,
WASH.
POST
(May
15,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/15/americas-mostgerrymandered-congressional-districts/?utm_term=.399426546d97 (explaining
how the “funky” shape of a district “can serve as a useful proxy for how
gerrymandered the district is”).
33
See Micah Altman, The Computational Complexity of Automated
Redistricting: Is Automation the Answer?, 23 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L. J. 81,
123–24 (1997). For example, automated software instructed to value compactness
over equal population will sacrifice some population equality to improve
compactness.
34
Id. To do this, the software creates a population of plans that deviate slightly
from the original in terms of desired factors. From that population, it selects a
subset of plans which express the greatest mix of these desired factors. Id. The
program then deletes plans falling outside of this selected subset, and it uses the
remaining subset to generate the next population. Id.
35
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 890.
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legislature’s intent to gerrymander. Further, the pursuit of traditional
districting objectives such as compactness and equal population
prevents observers from using these factors as “a useful proxy for
how gerrymandered the district is.”36
A. How Automated Districting Software Hides the Intent to
Gerrymander
To successfully claim partisan gerrymandering, claimants must
prove that the body in control of implementing the district plan
gerrymandered intentionally.37 Courts have considered two
frameworks for these claims. Originally, courts framed
gerrymandering as a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
issue.38 Because political affiliation is not a universally invidious
classifier like race or geography, the Supreme Court initially
designed a difficult test when applying equal protection to partisan
gerrymandering.39 To avoid the issue of classifiers altogether,
Justices Stevens and Kennedy proposed that partisan
gerrymandering be framed under the First Amendment.40 So far, the
Supreme Court has rejected the First Amendment framework.41 As
Justice Scalia articulated in Vieth, “a First Amendment claim, if it
were sustained, would render unlawful all consideration of political
affiliation in districting,” but the Court had already acknowledged
that some considerations of political affiliation were appropriate in

36

Ingraham, supra note 32.
See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
38
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558, 562 (1964) (holding that
“[l]egislatures represent people,” and so Constitutional protection of political
equality must mean “one person, one vote”).
39
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133–36 (1986) (holding that partisan
gerrymandering violates equal protection only when it “substantially
disadvantages certain voters” across several elections).
40
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(arguing that allegations of partisan gerrymandering “involve the First
Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their
participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their association with a
political party, or their expression of political views”).
41
See id. at 281 (plurality opinion); see also League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418–19 (2006).
37
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redistricting.42 These Fourteenth Amendment claims require proof
of intent to discriminate.43 As such, claims of partisan
gerrymandering continue to require proof of discriminatory intent.
Courts consider direct and circumstantial evidence when
identifying discriminatory intent.44 In the context of partisan
gerrymandering, evidence of discriminatory intent includes direct
admission of intent,45 witness testimony,46 and documents detailing
the drafting process.47 For example, the drafters and analysts in
Whitford v. Gill served as key expert witnesses when establishing
the legislature’s intent to gerrymander.48 The drafters of the district
plan in Whitford testified that they labeled potential plans as
“Assertive” or “Aggressive” to reflect the partisan advantage that a
particular plan would confer to the GOP under foreseeable
circumstances. 49 The Republican legislative leadership assessed
these plans based on “S” curves constructed by an analyst.50 These
“S” curves visually displayed the partisan advantage conferred by
42

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 294 (plurality opinion) (holding that some political
considerations, such as competitive districts, are appropriate).
43
See Davis, 478 U.S. at 127 (holding that plaintiffs bringing Fourteenth
Amendment claims of partisan gerrymandering must prove that the legislature
discriminated intentionally).
44
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977) (“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available.”).
45
See Common Cause v. Rucho, 240 F. Supp. 3d 376, 378–79 (2017)
(describing how the legislature “‘acknowledge[d] freely that this would be a
political gerrymander,’ which [the drafting Committee member] maintained ‘is
not against the law’”).
46
See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 911–12 (2016).
47
See id. at 850–51 (recounting documents of Wisconsin’s 2012 district plan
showing the emphasis placed on partisan advantage).
48
See id. at 923 (finding an intent to gerrymander because “[t]he drafters
themselves disproved any argument to the contrary each time they produced a
statewide draft plan that performed satisfactorily on legitimate districting criteria
without attaining an expected partisan advantage as drastic as [the implemented
plan]”).
49
Id. at 849.
50
See id. at 850–51 (explaining that graphs displaying the number of seats the
GOP would win relative to the percentage of votes they received formed an “S”
shape).
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each plan across a range of possible electoral scenarios.51 One of the
drafters presented their plans to the Republican caucus, and in his
notes for that presentation, wrote, “[t]he maps we pass will
determine who’s [in the Wisconsin Assembly] 10 years from
now.”52
So far, cases of gerrymandering have depended on these
document trails and witness testimony to prove discriminatory
intent. In Cooper v. Harris, the Supreme Court differentiated the
plaintiffs’ successful claim of racial gerrymandering from failed
claims by noting how the successful claim “turned not on the
possibility of creating more optimally constructed districts, but on
direct evidence of the General Assembly’s intent in creating the
actual District 12.”53 In Whitford v. Gill, recognizing the importance
of the documents used to produce the gerrymandered district plan,
the Wisconsin legislature resisted three court orders for document
production before finally relinquishing the documents alongside a
fine of $17,000.54 Legislatures understand the importance of these
witnesses and records, and so a clear step in hiding their intent to
gerrymander from the “casual observer”55 would be to ensure that
these witnesses and records never existed in the first place.
Automated districting software would accomplish an interested
legislature’s goal of removing direct and circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent from the public eye. Existing open-source
software can be acquired freely and anonymously and used by
individuals with limited software experience.56 With limited
development, this software could become intuitive enough for use
51

See id.
Id. at 853.
53
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1462–63 (2017) (explaining also how
District 12 discriminated against black voters by diluting their voting power).
54
See Matthew DeFour, Democrats’ Short-lived 2012 Recall Victory Led to
Key Evidence in Partisan Gerrymandering Case, WIS. ST. J. (July 23, 2017),
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/democrats-short-livedrecall-victory-led-to-key-evidence-in/article_d5cfb956-6e93-5c81-8403050493b5412e.html.
55
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 890.
56
See generally Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better
Automated Redistricting, J. STAT. SOFTWARE, June 2011, at 1 (presenting open
source redistricting software that runs on freely available software).
52

DEC. 2017]

BIASED MACHINES

77

by completely untrained individuals. In that case, a single member
of the legislature could independently draft the state’s district plan.
Worse yet, a trained drafter could direct the software to produce a
less extreme gerrymander that falls just out of reach of the courts’
tentative attempts at judicial management.57 This would leave
potential plaintiffs with few witnesses capable of testifying to the
intent behind the creation of the district plan.
Automated districting software would also do away with the
document trail detailing the drafting process. Like human drafters,
heuristic redistricting software generates alternative district plans as
it pursues its objectives.58 Unlike human drafters, however,
automated software generates anywhere from hundreds to thousands
of alternative plans in the span of minutes,59 and the programs often
delete old iterations once they are no longer needed.60 Unless
mandated by public record law, legislatures would have no need to
stockpile drafted plans for analysis. Instead, they would receive a
single, finished product with no trail of breadcrumbs marking the
intent behind its creation.
Because automated districting software sweeps away its own
breadcrumb trail, legislatures could evade accusations of removing
information from the public record. Legislatures cannot withhold
information from the public record if the legislature never recorded
that information in the first place.61 If the lone drafter of a district
plan was called as a witness and asked what they inputted into their
57

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268
(2017) (No. 16-1161) (acknowledging that the proposed legal standard only
intended to catch “the extreme gerrymander, the one that is fundamentally
antidemocratic and is going to last for the full decade”).
58
See Altman & McDonald, supra note 56, at 14–15.
59
See id.
60
See Kevin Baas, AUTO-REDISTRICT, http://autoredistrict.org/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2017).
61
See Micah Altman et al., Revealing Preferences: Why Gerrymanders are
Hard to Prove, and What to Do about It 14 (Mar. 22, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Social Science Research Network),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2583528 (explaining how in cases of partisan
gerrymandering, even when courts “provide plaintiffs access to plans, reports,
emails, and other information shielded from public view,” those “plaintiffs and
courts will only gather as much evidence as was archived”).
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districting software, the drafter could simply reply, “I did not write
it down and do not remember.” How would the court distinguish
between a malicious legislature attempting to defraud the public
from an innocent legislature who simply wanted to cheaply and
quickly draft a new district plan? The number of possible district
plans for a state approaches infinity.62 Armed only with a copy of
the program and an observable district plan, a researcher who hunts
for a legislature’s intent to gerrymander would search for a needle
in a haystack. Without a preemptive requirement to archive the
districting process, then, legislatures will leave little to no direct or
circumstantial evidence of their intent to gerrymander.
Even without these tools, strong evidence of the effects of a
defendant’s action can allow courts to statistically infer the
defendant’s intent. For example, disparate impact Title VII
employment discrimination claims are also grounded in Fourteenth
Amendment anti-discrimination law.63 In these claims, plaintiffs can
establish an employer’s intent to discriminate by proving “gross
statistical disparities” in that employer’s practices.64 In Hazelwood
School District v. United States,65 the Supreme Court compared the
differences between the hiring practices of the defendant to the
hiring practices of the general population.66 This analysis assumed
that absent discriminatory intent, the defendant’s hiring practices
should at least resemble the hiring practices of the general public.
The Supreme Court explained that trial courts should only infer an
intent to discriminate when the plaintiffs proved a gross disparity
between what the defendant’s hiring practices were and what the
defendant’s hiring practices should have been.67

62

Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5.4 ELECTION L.J. 412,
419 (2006).
63
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977) (holding
that discriminatory hiring practiced deprived minority workers of their Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection).
64
Id. at 307.
65
433 U.S. 299 (1977).
66
Id.
67
See id. (“‘[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the
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Gross statistical disparity is harder to prove than ordinary
disparity.68 Circumstantial evidence can establish a disparity by
showing at least some inequality.69 Gross disparity, however,
requires proof of the degree of inequality.70 This proof must come in
the form of statistical evidence, and courts have come to interpret
the standard as requiring confidence stemming from statistical
significance.71 As the next section will show, however, automated
software makes the effects of partisan gerrymandering difficult to
prove even without a requirement of statistical significance.
B. How Automated Districting Software Hides the Effects of a
Gerrymander
Under a Fourteenth Amendment framework, intent is not
enough to compel court action in the face of a partisan gerrymander.
As the Supreme Court articulated in Davis v. Bandemer, “even if a
state legislature redistricts with the specific intention of
disadvantaging one political party’s election prospects, we do not
believe that there has been an unconstitutional discrimination
against members of that party unless the redistricting does in fact
disadvantage it at the polls.”72 To successfully bring a claim of
partisan gerrymandering, then, plaintiffs must show that the
gerrymander has an effect on the district plan.73

community from which employees are hired.”) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977)).
68
See id. at 311–12 (“[T]he disparity between 3.7% (the percentage of Negro
teachers hired by Hazelwood in 1972-1973 and 1973-1974) and 5.7% may be
sufficiently small to weaken the Government’s other proof, while the disparity
between 3.7% and 15.4% may be sufficiently large to reinforce it.”).
69
See id. at 309 n.15 (explaining that “where relevant aspects of the
decisionmaking process had undergone little change” after implementation of
Title VII could serve as evidence of racial discrimination).
70
See id.; see also Allan G. King, “Gross Statistical Disparities” as Evidence
of a Pattern and Practice of Discrimination: Statistical Versus Legal Significance,
22 LAB. LAW. 271, 272 (2007) (noting that “lower courts frequently have turned
to ‘statistical significance’ as the measuring rod” for gross disparity).
71
See King, supra note 70, at 272.
72
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986).
73
See id. (indicating that unlawful discrimination in redistricting will only be
found where the redistricting “does [damage] at the polls”).
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One traditional effect of a gerrymander is the loss of legitimate
districting objectives such as compactness or equal population.74 As
recently as 2004, the Supreme Court considered it a “well-settled
principle[]” that “a district’s peculiar shape might be a symptom of
an illicit purpose in the line-drawing process.”75 This line of thinking
stems from the fact that previous districting techniques prioritized
partisan advantage at the cost of traditional districting objectives
such that the resulting districts warped into unusual shapes. 76 Even
gerrymanders drafted using modern mapping software can display
abnormal shapes.77 For example, North Carolina’s District 12 snakes
along I-85 like a thread, precisely enveloping minority
communities.78
Some modern gerrymanders leverage mapping software to
become visually indistinguishable from non-gerrymandered plans,79
but even those plans sacrifice some traditional districting objectives
to maximize partisan advantage. For example, the human drafters in
Whitford performed an “eyeball test” to ensure that traditional
districting principles did not fall outside acceptable boundaries.80 As
a result, each iteration of their district plan increased in terms of
partisan advantage, but their compliance with traditional districting
objectives remained steady.81 The court later held that though the
drafters “were attentive to traditional districting criteria,” the effects
of their gerrymander remained evident by their series of maps which
“improved upon the anticipated pro-Republican advantage.”82
Automated districting software can pursue these factors
alongside partisan advantage. 83 Though this pursuit could come at
74

See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 321 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
76
See Miller, supra note 23.
77
See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1462–63 (2017) (holding that North
Carolina’s District 12 is a racial gerrymander).
78
See id.
79
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 889 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (“Highly
sophisticated mapping software now allows lawmakers to pursue partisan
advantage without sacrificing compliance with traditional districting criteria.”).
80
Id. at 849.
81
See id.
82
Id. at 849–50.
83
See Altman & McDonald, supra note 56, at 14–15.
75
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the cost of some partisan advantage, it would confound attempts to
find the effects of gerrymandering by correlating increases in one
factor to increases in the other. If, for example, increases in
compactness equally corresponded to increases in partisan
advantage, an observer would not immediately know whether the
drafters pursued partisan advantage as its own objective or,
alternatively, the innocent pursuit of compactness tragically resulted
in disparate partisan advantage because of natural factors.
Instead, analysis of the effects of a partisan gerrymander would
depend entirely on the comparison between the partisan advantage
observed in the gerrymander and the average partisan advantage that
would have been observed in the absence of a gerrymander.84 As in
Hazelwood,85 plaintiffs attempting to infer a discriminatory intent to
gerrymander from the effects of that gerrymander would need to
prove a “gross disparity” between the partisan advantage a district
plan conferred and the partisan advantage that district plan should
have conferred absent discriminatory intent. Several metrics allow
experts to attribute the partisan advantage observed in a single
election to the effects of a district plan.86 The difficulty arises when
attempting to determine how much partisan advantage a district plan
should have conferred.87
Natural factors such as political geography and shifting voter
preferences significantly impact the partisan advantage conferred by
a district plan.88 Certain political groups tend to live in denser
populations than others.89 When drawing districts to maximize
84

See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 920 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977).
86
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 835–36 (2015).
87
See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 920 (acknowledging that the ever-changing
and difficult to measure metrics of partisan advantage make it “more difficult to
draw politically competitive districts” in some parts of the state).
88
See Jowei Chen & David Cottrell, Evaluating Partisan Gains from
Congressional Gerrymandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the
Effect of Gerrymandering in the US House, 44 ELECTORAL STUD. 329, 330
(2016).
89
Report for Defendants, Nicholas Goedert at 11, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp.
3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc) (explaining that Wisconsin
Democrats lived in denser populations than Wisconsin Republicans).
85
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compactness and equal population, those dense populations more
likely fall in the same district. This weakens the voting strength of
those political groups by unintentionally packing them together until
they elect candidates by wide margins. In Whitford, Wisconsin
successfully convinced the court that its “political geography
naturally favors Republicans because Democratic voters reside in
more geographically concentrated areas.”90 Consequently, the court
recognized that perfect proportionality between seats and votes
could not serve as an accurate guidepost for the partisan advantage
a district plan should confer in the absence of a partisan
gerrymander.91
These natural factors impede the quantification of partisan
advantage for establishing a gross disparity. When challenged, the
plaintiffs’ experts in Whitford acknowledged that “partisan intent is
its own independent inquiry” separate from their analyses of the
district plan’s effects.92 The natural factors affecting partisan
advantage do not lay stagnant. Even neutral district plans produce
wildly disparate partisan advantages from state to state and year to
year.93 Tides of voters supporting an attractive candidate can create
the false appearance of “packed” districts.94 Droughts, where an
otherwise dominant political party fails to muster to the polls, can
tip the scales across multiple districts and create the false appearance
of “cracking.”95 Dramatic shifts in population as industries grow and

90

Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 912.
See id.
92
Plaintiffs’ Rebuttal Report, Simon Jackman at 3, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.
Supp. 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (3:15-cv-00421-bbc).
93
Report for Defendants, Nicholas Goedert at 11, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp.
3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc) (showing that 45% of all plans
observed in Professor Simon Jackman’s historical study at some point expressed
enough partisan advantage to attract judicial scrutiny under the Whitford
standard).
94
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 86, at 834. A district is “packed”
when a large majority of voters support one political party in excess of the number
required to win that district’s election.
95
See id. A district is “cracked” when a minority of voters consistently lose that
district’s election by a slim margin. Id.
91
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die jumble voting populations amongst existing districts.96 Even
when observation of past elections grants researchers and courts a
sense of how much partisan advantage a district plan should likely
confer, the wild variance inherent in any measurement of partisan
advantage makes precision practically impossible.97 Understanding
this, even experts seeking to prove the effects of partisan
gerrymandering openly acknowledged that their findings could not
support an inference of the legislature’s intent.98
Instead, courts like that in Whitford do not attempt to infer the
intent behind a partisan gerrymander from that gerrymander’s
effects.99 The court in Whitford concluded that the “modest[]
advantage” conferred to the Republican Party by Wisconsin’s
political geography failed to “explain the magnitude” of the total
partisan effect of the district plan.100 However, it based its decision
on the less burdensome partisan effects of other plans the drafters
considered but ultimately rejected.101 Without this context, the court
acknowledged that the study of the effects of natural factors on
partisan advantage “lacked specificity and careful analysis.”102
Without this necessary specificity, the court instead based its

96

Report for Defendants, Nicholas Goedert at 18, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp.
3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc) (explaining how population
density can affect partisan advantage).
97
Id. at 15 (explaining that “within a single state, where small variations in
incumbency and candidate choice may have greater impact on aggregated results,
fluctuations across elections could be even larger”).
98
Plaintiffs’ Rebuttal Report, Simon Jackman at 3, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.
Supp. 3d 837 (3:15-cv-00421-bbc).
99
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 895 n.277 (W.D. Wis. 2016)
(“Although we might find the Wisconsin legislature’s procedures to be
counterproductive, the actions on which the plaintiffs rely appear simply to be par
for the legislative course. We do not discount the possibility, however, that, in
some other states, these actions may suggest a deviation from regular procedures
from which an inference of discriminatory intent may arise.”).
100
Id. at 921, 924.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 926–27 (presenting studies on the effects of natural geography that
relied on either data gathered after the election or hypothetical alternative district
plans, but neither method swayed the court.).
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holding on the existence of an alternative plan that afforded much
less partisan advantage to the Republican party.103
Historically, the Supreme Court has not been amenable to the
techniques which swayed the Wisconsin District Court. In League
of Latin American Citizens v. Perry,104 Justice Kennedy warned that
“[e]ven assuming a court could choose reliably among different
models of shifting voter preferences,” the Court would remain
“wary of adopting” a standard based on “a hypothetical state of
affairs.”105 In Gill v. Whitford,106 Chief Justice Roberts echoed this
distaste for social science, calling the statistical evidence presented
in Whitford “sociological gobbledygook.”107 Therefore, automated
districting technology interferes with the public’s ability to detect
partisan gerrymandering by blurring the line between partisan
advantage arising naturally and partisan advantage arising from an
intentional gerrymander. This forces plaintiffs to prove the effects
of gerrymandering using methods not yet accepted by the Supreme
Court.
In sum, automated districting will interfere with the public’s
ability to bring claims of partisan gerrymandering. By leaving
behind as few as one witness and almost no documents, automated
districting software will offer the public less evidence of a
legislature’s intent to gerrymander. By pursuing legitimate
districting factors and blurring the line between natural and
unnatural partisan advantage, automated districting software will
make the effects of gerrymanders even harder to detect. Combined,
the features of automated districting software will worsen the
already precarious state of judicial management over partisan
gerrymandering. As Part III will argue, combatting these ill effects
103

Id. at 926 (“[I]t is very possible to draw a map with much less of a partisan
bent than Act 43 and, therefore, that Act 43’s large partisan effect is not due to
Wisconsin’s natural political geography.”).
104
League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
105
Id. at 419–20 (rejecting a test which compared how each party “would fare
hypothetically if they each (in turn) had received a given percentage of the vote”
because it would “depend on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers will
reside”).
106
Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161).
107
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017)
(No. 16-1161).
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will require independent commissions, transparent districting, or
improved methods for measuring the partisan effects of
gerrymandering.
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE EFFECTS OF AUTOMATED DISTRICTING
SOFTWARE
Claimants have fought for decades to convince courts to
recognize partisan gerrymandering claims.108 The advent of new
technologies would not undo those decades of work and forever
snatch partisan gerrymandering from the hands of the courts. Rather,
automated districting software would tug partisan gerrymandering
just out of the courts’ immediate reach by hiding or eliminating
evidence used to satisfy the intent and effect prong of the Whitford
standard. To counteract the effects of automated districting
software, then, plaintiffs, courts, or society at large could (1) allow
neutral third parties to redistrict; (2) impose transparency on the
redistricting process; or (3) develop techniques to more accurately
measure the effects of partisan gerrymandering.
A. Allowing Neutral Third Parties to Redistrict
Rather than having their power to redistrict ripped from them
through judicial management, legislatures could recognize the
conflict of interest presented by gerrymandering and willingly
surrender their Article I redistricting power to third parties.109
Reformation of the redistricting process is the most clear and direct
way to remove the roadblocks created by automated districting
software.110 For example, the state governments of Arizona and
California have handed off their district-drafting powers to
independent commissions entrusted to draft new district plans
108

See, e.g., Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State
Redistricting Reform to Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 543, 547 (2011) (noting that courts seriously considered suits for partisan
gerrymandering since as early as Davis v. Bandemer in 1986).
109
U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 4 (conferring to legislatures the power to determine
“[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections”).
110
See Hebert & Jenkins, supra note 108, at 555 (“State government reforms,
on the other hand, offer the most promising avenue toward reducing excessive
partisan gerrymandering.”).
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without partisan considerations.111 Safety measures, such as staffing
commissions with an even number of members from each political
party, ensure that both parties’ interests are preserved during the
drafting process.112
This solution, however, depends on the Legislature’s
willingness to surrender their redistricting power. In 2004, only
twelve states handled redistricting through third-party
commissions. 113 As of 2016, that number rose as ten more states
reformed their respective redistricting processes.114 As for the
remaining states, however, only time will tell. Legislatures might
not willingly sacrifice the power to influence election outcomes
through gerrymandering just to avoid public backlash. If particularly
strong gerrymanders withstand judicial scrutiny, then dominant
legislatures might escape public backlash altogether. After all,
stripped of their power to vote the perpetrators out of office, the
dissenting portion of the public would be left with little recourse.
Another possible response, the adoption of independent
redistricting commissions, could end partisan gerrymandering
altogether, or at least curb the practice. Some fear that partisan
considerations will seep into third-party commissions and that the
facial neutrality of the practice will shield the commissions from
public suspicion.115 Even if the independent commissions are not
faultless, they experience a less blatant conflict of interest when
redistricting as compared to legislatures.116 Mass implementation of
these commissions would overall reduce drafters’ incentive to craft
111

See id. at 556–57.
See id. (citing as an example Arizona’s five-member commission which
consists of “no more than two from any political party”).
113
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 362 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114
See Eric Petry, Redistricting Reform Gains Momentum in 2016, BRENNAN
CENT. JUST. (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/redistrictingreform-gains-momentum-2016.
115
See Alan Greenblatt, Can Redistricting Ever Be Fair?, GOVERNING MAG.
(Nov. 2011), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/can-redistricting-everbe-fair.html (explaining how the GOP in California suspected the state’s
independent districting commission of secretly furthering the interests of the
Democratic party).
116
See id. (recalling how “there were conflicts of interest among those doing
the drawing” in California’s independent commission).
112
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partisan gerrymanders, and this will ideally lead to less extreme
gerrymanders nationwide.
B. Imposing Transparency on the Redistricting Process
Alternatively, courts or state governments could impose a
degree of transparency upon the redistricting process by requiring
legislatures to publish the source code of their redistricting software.
Rather than forcing the public to scrounge for evidence of legislative
intent after a gerrymandered plan is implemented, a transparent
redistricting process would theoretically provide evidence of intent
during the drafting process. The term “transparent redistricting”
refers to a redistricting process where the public either actively
participates in the redistricting process117 or at least receives enough
information about the redistricting process to offer meaningful
feedback or hold the drafters accountable for the district plan.118
Public involvement in redistricting could involve anything from
close attention to a district plan by hobbyists all the way to mass
internet participation through open-source redistricting software.119
Public disclosure of the redistricting process would, at a minimum,
involve a complete record of the communications between the
drafters of a plan and interested legislative parties.120
When legislatures construct plans using automated districting
software, all communications between the legislature and the
117

See, e.g., Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, How Independent
Commissions Could Use the Internet and Open Software to Maximize
Transparency and Public Engagement in Redistricting, SCHOLARS STRATEGY
NETWORK
(July
2014),
http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/ssn_key_findings_alt
man_and_mcdonald_on_redistricting_reform_at_internet_scale_0.pdf.
118
See, e.g., Michael Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform
in Local Redistricting, 11 ELECTION L.J. 446, 451 (2012) (“[F]or voters to be able
to hold legislators accountable for redistricting decisions, the voting public must
be properly informed about the decisions made.”).
119
See, e.g., Altman & McDonald, supra note 117.
120
BRUCE E. CAIN & KARIN MAC DONALD, TRANSPARENCY AND
REDISTRICTING: A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO COMPETITION AND REDISTRICTING
IN CALIFORNIA: LESSONS FOR REFORM 1–2 (2006) (“The basic components of
openness are: a definition of what constitutes a meeting, notification of the
meeting time and place, an agenda prepared in advance, opportunities for public
input and stipulations of exceptions.”).
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drafters are necessarily present in the program’s code and the data
used. Supplied with a redistricting software’s code and the data it
used, third parties could replicate that software’s results to
understand what, how, and why the software constructed the
district.121 In other words, automated districting software could
become the perfect witness for holding legislative bodies
accountable for the effects of district plans, provided that the
software is readily accessible to the public.122
Unfortunately, legislatures may be able to withhold the
information required to transform automated districting software
into a perfect witness. The “Speech and Debate” clause of the
Constitution provides that “for any Speech or Debate in either
House, [members of the House or Congress] shall not be questioned
in any other Place.”123 Many state constitutions parallel this clause.124
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether these clauses
include a non-disclosure right to legislatures.125 This uncertainty has
split the federal circuits.126 The D.C. Circuit interprets the Speech
and Debate clause to confer broad non-disclosure rights, but the
Ninth and Third Circuit do not.127 In light of this uncertainty, some
state courts have also interpreted the Speech and Debate clause to
121

Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers
in Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 105 (2010) (“Full
transparency thus requires that redistricting plans be made available in nonproprietary formats that are easily read . . . .”).
122
Id.
123
U.S. CONST. ART I, § 6.
124
See Michael L. Shenkman, Talking About Speech or Debate: Revisiting
Legislative Immunity, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 363 n.58 (2013) (noting
how courts have “discussed the shared history underlying the Constitution’s
Speech or Debate Clause and parallel legislative immunity provisions in many
state constitutions”).
125
Philip Mayer, An Uncertain Privilege: Reexamining the Scope and
Protections of the Speech or Debate Clause, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 229,
238 (2017) (“The Court has not resolved whether the Clause’s protections
‘include a privilege not to disclose documents that fall within the sphere of
legislative activity, as opposed to a privilege that merely bars the evidentiary use
of such documents.’”) (quoting S.E.C. v. The Comm. on Ways & Means of the
U.S. House of Representatives, 161 F. Supp. 3d 199, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
126
Id. at 238–39.
127
Id.
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include non-disclosure privileges for state legislatures.128 In the
context of racial gerrymandering, some have worried that, due to the
difficulty of establishing intent in cases of gerrymandering, “[i]f
future plaintiffs were cut off from discovering information like . . .
written correspondence . . . members of Congress and redistricting
bodies generally would be insulated from scrutiny by private
litigants.”129 Due to the equally difficult standard of intent for
partisan gerrymandering explained in Part II, this fear should extend
with equal force to cases of partisan gerrymandering.
Just as state legislatures can lend away their power to redistrict,
so too can they give up the protection of the Speech and Debate
clause.130 Modeled after the Freedom of Information Act, state
“sunshine laws” impose requirements on legislatures to reveal to the
public information that they otherwise could have kept secret.131 To
combat partisan gerrymandering, state legislatures could create for
themselves a duty to record and publish the districting process, even
if that process consists of code from automated districting software.
As with independent commissions, however, this solution relies on
the legislature’s willingness to self-regulate. Further, transparent
districting at most satisfies the intent prong of the partisan
gerrymandering standard. To bring a successful claim, plaintiffs still
need a reliable way to measure the effects of partisan gerrymanders.
C. Measuring the Effects of Partisan Gerrymanders to Identify
Gross Disparity
New techniques for measuring partisan advantage would allow
plaintiffs to cut through the obfuscating effects of automated
districting software by inferring an intent to gerrymander from that
gerrymander’s effects. Inferring intent from effects requires
plaintiffs to show a “gross disparity” between an observed value and
128

Edward Collaghan, Speech and Debate, 16 TOURO L. REV. 709, 711–12
(2000) (explaining how New York state courts used the Speech and Debate Clause
to justify the legislature’s non-disclosure of a “computer modeling system for the
funding of public schools”).
129
Mark Tyson, Monitored Disclosure: A Way to Avoid Legislative Supremacy
in Redistricting Litigation, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2012).
130
See id.
131
Id.
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an expected value to indicate the presence of discrimination.132 In
other words, what happened clearly differed from what should have
happened. Thanks to many years of study, social scientists already
have multiple metrics for partisan advantage,133 or, as Chief Justice
Roberts would call them, “sociological gobbledygook.”134
Fortunately, courts already employ similar “gobbledygook”135 in
other areas of law—such as toxic torts,136 environmental law,137 and
employment discrimination138—without litigation devolving into an
endless battle of experts. As in those other areas of law, judicial
management would curb extreme abuses of law without
overburdening the courts.
There is a long history of “gobbledygook”139 persuading courts
in the absence of other evidence. For example, in Allen v. United
States,140 plaintiffs alleged that open-air atomic bomb tests had
resulted in multiple deaths by radiation poisoning.141 Though the
court of appeals later found in favor of the government,142 the lower
court properly articulated how statistical evidence can establish

132

Hazelwood School Dist. v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977).
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 2, at 835–36.
134
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, supra note 107, at 2289.
135
Id.
136
See Note, Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128
HARV. L. REV. 2256, 2268 (2015) (“In toxic tort cases, findings of causation
typically rely on epidemiological evidence, which relies heavily on statistical
analyses and mathematical or computer modeling to make probabilistic
determinations of risk and contribution.”).
137
See id. at 2268–69 (explaining how environmental law claims “rely heavily
on statistical and modeling methods, and these fields also tend to be able to only
predict risks based on observed correlations”).
138
See Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34
WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1281 (1988) (explaining how, even though natural factors
can create wage disparities, “statistical imbalance in the work force” can
nevertheless act as evidence for an intent to discriminate).
139
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, supra note 107, at 2289.
140
Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 257–58 (D. Utah 1984) overruled
by Allen v. Unites States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
141
Id.
142
Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the actions taken by the government fell under a “discretionary function
exception” that prevented relief).
133
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causation even in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence.143
As the power of computers increased, computer modeling became a
powerful litigation tool in toxic torts and environmental law.144
Specifically, in these fields, courts consider computer modeling as
an “accepted and, in appropriate circumstances, reliable method . . .
where contamination cannot be traced entirely to a specific source
and when the extent of contamination is difficult to determine.”145
As automated districting masks the source and magnitude of
partisan advantage, plaintiffs bringing claims of partisan
gerrymandering should similarly use computer modeling as a
reliable method of proving causation. Recently, several studies have
adopted new computing algorithms to generate a representative
sample of randomized alternative district plans.146 These studies
define a solution space of possible alternative plans the legislature
could have successfully submitted and then randomly generate a
sample of plans within that solution space without using partisan
data.147 If the algorithms do not use partisan data, it would be
impossible for them to intentionally generate gerrymandered district
plans.148 Therefore, one would expect that a large enough sample
143
Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 416 (“Where the injuries are causally
indistinguishable, and where experts cannot determine whether an individual
injury arises from culpable human cause or non-culpable natural causes, evidence
that there is an increased incidence of the injury in a population following
exposure to defendant’s risk-creating conduct may justify an inference of ‘causal
linkage’ between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injuries.”) (citation omitted).
144
See Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 136, at 2268 (“In toxic tort
cases, findings of causation typically rely on epidemiological evidence, which
relies heavily on statistical analyses and mathematical or computer modeling to
make probabilistic determinations of risk and contribution.”).
145
City of Wichita, Kansas v. Trustees of APCO Oil Corp. Liquidating Tr., 306
F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1108 (D. Kan. 2003).
146
See Mira Bernstein & Moon Duchin, A Formula Goes to Court: Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, PHYSICS AND SOC’Y 5 (2017),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.10812.
147
See Gregory Herschlag et al., Evaluating Partisan Gerrymandering in
Wisconsin 1 (2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.01596 (explaining how “none of
[their] design criteria have any partisan tilt,” and so the algorithm has no data on
partisan advantage with which it could craft a gerrymander).
148
See id. (explaining how “none of [their] design criteria have any partisan
tilt,” and so the algorithm has no data on partisan advantage with which it could
craft a gerrymander).
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generated by these algorithms would represent the average district
plan a voter would receive in the absence of a gerrymander.
These studies run the risk that their simulated elections fail to
accurately reflect reality.149 For a district plan to fall within the
solution space, it must be one that the legislature could have
reasonably adopted in place of the gerrymandered plan. To be
reasonably adopted, a district plan must be constitutional and
desirable.150 To be constitutional, a district plan must be contiguous,
must have districts of relatively equal size, and must comply with
the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by having enough majority-minority
districts.151 These requirements are generally easier to measure and
define. To be desirable, however, a district plan must be compact
and must not split too many communities of interest.152 A plan with
worm-like districts whose borders split roads and towns would be
rejected even though no constitutional requirements prevent its
adoption. When attempting to define a solution space for alternative
district plans, these factors become problematic because they are
decided based on visual scrutiny and the vague weighing of
interests. Plenty of models can maximize desirable factors like
compactness, 153 but the question “when would a district plan be
rejected based on compactness or split-counties?” is ultimately
subjective. Even when state laws require districts to be drawn so
“not irregularly shaped”154 or to “coincide with the boundaries of
political subdivisions of the State,”155 the weight of those factors
against others depends on the priorities of the legislature. For
example, drafters could reasonably turn down plans that maximize
compactness in favor of plans with more equal population.
149

See Trustees of APCO Oil Corp. Liquidating Tr., 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1108
(“[A] model is only an estimate and the accuracy of the estimate depends to a
considerable extent on the data selected for use in the computer model, the quality
and reliability of that data and, of course, the skill of the modeler.”).
150
See Herschlag et al., supra note 147, at 1 (designing its representative sample
based on “redistricting plans that satisfy design criteria laid out in the Wisconsin
constitution, statutes, and relevant court cases”).
151
See, e.g., Chen & Cottrell, supra note 87, at 336.
152
See H.B. 92, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.C. 2015).
153
See, e.g., Altman & McDonald, supra note 56, at 4.
154
N.C. H.B. 92.
155
Id. at 92 § 120-4.54(e).
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Therefore, any attempt to define a solution space for all possible
alternative district plans risks introducing bias by objectively
defining subjective boundaries.
Further, because voters do not cast new ballots for simulated
district plans, researchers must use data collected from the voting
tabulation districts (VTDs) of real elections. VTDs are the small
polling stations where votes are tabulated before they are
compiled.156 They act as the smallest unit of measurement when
analyzing vote distribution.157 Plugging election results directly from
VTDs into computer-generated district plans assumes that each
VTD would have produced the same or similar vote share even
under a different district plan. However, that is not necessarily the
case. Just as the proportion of a minority population in a district
changes that demographic’s voter turnout,158 so too does a political
party’s representation in a district change that party’s voter
turnout.159 District plans also affect other factors that influence
election results, such as campaign spending and whether to contest
a district by putting forward a candidate.160 Therefore, applying the
VTD data from one district plan to another introduces bias because
VTD data would change between district plans.
Recent approaches using Markov-Chain Monte Carlo
algorithms may help to overcome these challenges.161 Rather than
attempting to define the outer limits of a solution space for
alternative district plans, these projects focus in the opposite
direction by defining its solution space in terms of compliance with
legitimate districting factors, such as compactness, equal
population, preservation of communities of interest, and compliance
156

See JONATHAN C. MATTINGLY & CHRISTY VAUGHN, REDISTRICTING AND
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 1 (2014), https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.8796.
157

See id. at 1 (designing a program to construct a representative sample of
reasonable district plans using real data from Voting Tabulation Districts).
158
See, e.g., Bernard Fraga, Redistricting and the Causal Impact of Race on
Voter Turnout, 78 J. POL. 19, 19 (2015).
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See Simon Hix et al., The Effects of District Magnitude on Voting Behavior,
79 J. POL. 356, 360 (2017).
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See Herschlag et al., supra note 147, at 7; see also Chen & Cottrell, supra
note 87, at 329.
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with the VRA.162 From there, the algorithm takes a random walk
through possible variations of that district plan by repeatedly
tweaking the plan.163 This process results in an “ensemble” of district
plans that represent the possible district plans that could have been
drafted in the absence of an intent to gerrymander.164 By situating
actual district plans alongside this ensemble, researchers can
determine whether the real district plans fall outside the expected
range of partisan advantage.165 The greater the difference between
the ensemble and the actual plan, the greater the likelihood that the
actual plan is a partisan gerrymander.166
To address the issue of different plans modifying voter behavior,
these new studies do not confine themselves to a single voting
outcome. Rather, they compare the performance of Republican and
Democratic political parties across a range of possible voting
outcomes based on multiple elections and average variation.167
Because these studies considered voting outcomes beyond those
observed, their results do not depend on how voters would react to
their hypothetical districts. The studies address the full range of
probable voting outcomes, leading their models to more closely
reflect reality.
Studies generating control groups of alternative district plans
through the use of computer simulation have already gained some
attention in the courts. For example, during oral arguments in Gill v.
Whitford, Justice Kagan asked whether these computer-generated
plans could serve as “a way to filter out the effects of geography
from the effects of partisan advantage” if plaintiffs were to provide
“many, many of them, so that one can tell whether the actual map is
162

See id. (“The probability distribution will be concentrated on redistricting
plans which better satisfy the design speciﬁed in the laws and legal precedents
covering redistricting plans . . . .”).
163
See id. at 8.
164
See id. at 1.
165
See id. (explaining how the comparison between the 2012 Wisconsin district
plan and an algorithmically generated ensemble of alternative plans acted as
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166
Id.
167
See id. at 8 (explaining how the study began by testing each plan using
observed election results and then expanded those tests to include voting
outcomes within 7.5% of the observed values).
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an outlier.”168 The plaintiffs replied in the affirmative and referred to
a study conducted by Jowei Chen which created 200 alternative
district plans using an algorithm.169 They expressed optimism in
these programs, calling them “state of the art” and predicting that
“they will be in the record in almost every case.”170
Others have expressed less optimism. The State in Gill
foreshadowed a time where the judicial managing of partisan
gerrymandering would “shift districting from elected public
officials to federal courts, who would decide the fate of maps based
upon battles of the experts.”171 This bleak outlook considers a world
where plaintiffs turn the techniques used to craft partisan
gerrymanders back against the legislature.172 Instead of seeing an
end to partisan gerrymandering, this situation could threaten to
create a never-ending battle of experts where the prowess of the
mathematician—not the facts of the case—determines the outcome.
In this world of “math versus math, with democracy at stake,”173
judicial interference with the districting process would afflict, not
alleviate, the voter’s constitutional rights.
That world cannot exist in perpetuity. If courts adopt a legal
standard for the judicial management of partisan gerrymandering, a
wave of claims would crash into courtrooms across the nation. This
will arise from the uncertainty inherent in any new legal standard
involving statistical evidence.174 Seeing this period of uncertainty on
168
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the horizon instills the powerful yet unfounded fear that the
uncertainty will last forever. However, the initial wave of litigation
will act as a period of refinement and adjustment, not as an eternal
battleground for mathematicians.
The battle of experts is one-sided. When legislatures develop
new ways to disguise partisan gerrymanders, they do not beat back
or contest the public’s ability to detect those gerrymanders. Instead,
they identify the fringes of the public’s ability to detect
gerrymanders and create district plans that maximize partisan
advantage within that undetectable zone. Since partisan
gerrymandering first reached the Supreme Court, judges have
recognized that legislatures can use math to hide partisan
gerrymanders.175 When the public could only identify gerrymanders
by the naked eye, legislatures only sought to fool the human eye by
complying with districting factors and appearing as a legitimate
district.176 Math penetrates this surface-level disguise. When faced
with a representative sample of tens of thousands of alternative plans
that each comply with traditional districting criteria equally well,177
or an observational study demonstrating the plan’s “historically
large” partisan advantage,178 visual similarity to legitimate
districting plans fails to mask the gerrymander. Now that the public
uses math to detect partisan gerrymanders, legislatures seeking to
gerrymander will need to reduce the partisan advantage they
incorporate into their district plans to remain undetectable. As
techniques to detect partisan gerrymandering improve, this range of
undetectability shrinks.
To understand this one-sided relationship, consider the
following hypothetical. A factory dumps waste into an adjacent
statistical evidence, or worse, as a reason to not admit that there is uncertainty at
all.”).
175
See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 (1983) (explaining how “rapid
advances in computer technology” allow legislatures to further “secondary goals”
while complying with traditional districting factors).
176
See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 889 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (“Highly
sophisticated mapping software now allows lawmakers to pursue partisan
advantage without sacrificing compliance with traditional districting criteria.”).
177
See Herschlag et al., supra note 147, at 1.
178
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 908.
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river. The public implements a law prohibiting the dumping of that
waste. In response, the factory employs advanced mathematical
techniques to determine exactly how much waste they can dump
without being spotted by the naked eye. Later, the public develops a
better way to test the water for the factory’s waste. With all the math
in the world, the factory can at best recalculate exactly how much
waste it can dump without being detected by this new technique.
Despite the factory’s best efforts, improvements in the public’s
ability to detect the factory’s waste will force the factory to dump
less waste into the river.
Experts bringing claims against partisan gerrymanders will
mirror experts detecting waste in the river, and experts defending
partisan gerrymanders will mirror the experts calculating how much
waste could go undetected. The ensuing battle will be less a game
of tug of war and more a game of hide and seek. Continued advances
in the public’s ability to detect partisan gerrymandering will
constrict legislatures’ ability to craft those gerrymanders undetected.
Due to the difficulty of measuring partisan advantage, some
mathematicians predict that there may be a point where no amount
of math can distinguish between an ordinary plan and a partisan
gerrymander.179 Even if that point exists, however, it should not
prevent the judicial management of partisan gerrymandering. Until
experts reach this limit of detection, judicial involvement in partisan
gerrymandering will shrink the amount of partisan advantage
present in district plans. In this way, improvements in the
hypothetical generation of alternative district plans will allow
plaintiffs to bring increasingly effective claims, even in the face of
heightened burdens of proof.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without additional law or better techniques for generating
alternative district plans, legislatures will sidestep claims of partisan
gerrymandering by using automated districting software. For courts
179

Ellenberg, supra note 173 (“There will be many cases, maybe most of them,
where it’s impossible, no matter how much math you do, to tell the difference
between innocuous decision making and a scheme—like Wisconsin’s—designed
to protect one party from voters who might prefer the other.”).

98

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.

[VOL. 19: 67

to manage partisan gerrymandering, plaintiffs must bring claims
under a First or Fourteenth Amendment framework, and those
claims will require proof that the legislature intended to
discriminate.180 Presently, experts cannot infer an intent to
discriminate from even “historically large”181 instances of partisan
gerrymandering.182 This leaves potential plaintiffs with only direct
evidence, such as witness testimony, or circumstantial evidence,
such as the drafting process, to prove discriminatory intent.
Automated districting software eliminates both categories of
evidence, presenting plaintiffs with a difficult burden of proof
before they can persuade courts to intervene.
New laws that hand the power to draft new districts away to
independent commissions and similar laws that impose a degree of
transparency on the drafting process could eliminate the need for the
evidence obscured by automated districting software. More likely,
however, advancements in Monte Carlo algorithms will create
increasingly large and accurate representative samples of alternative
districting plans. By comparing these alternative plans to actual
district plans, researchers will detect gerrymandered outliers with
enough significance to infer intent even when all other evidence
remains hidden. Though computer-generated district plans might
not spell the end for partisan gerrymandering, it at least may resolve
the issues created by automated districting software, allowing for a
fairer democratic process.
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